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The geographical imbalance of the health workforce in Tanzania represents a serious 
problem when it comes to delivering crucial health services to a large share of the population. 
This study provides new quantitative information about how to make jobs in rural areas more 
attractive to newly educated clinical officers. A unique data set stemming from a discrete 
choice experiment with clinical officer finalists in Tanzania is applied. The results show that 
offering continuing education after a certain period of service is one of the most powerful 
recruitment instruments the authorities have available. Increased salaries and hardship 
allowances will also substantially increase recruitment in rural areas. Offers of decent housing 
and good infrastructure, including the provision of equipment, will increase recruitment to 
rural remote areas but not as much as higher wages and offers of education. Women are less 
responsive to pecuniary incentives and are more concerned with factors that directly allow 
them to do a good job, while those with parents living in a remote rural area are generally less 
responsive to the proposed policies. When the willingness to help other people is a strong 
motivating force, policies that improve the conditions for helping people appear particularly 
effective. 
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1. Introduction 
Human resources for health (HRH) are perhaps the single most important input to the health 
sector in low-income countries (Hongoro and McPake, 2004), and the shortage of health 
personnel and poor health worker performance together are one of the most pressing problems 
in these countries (Chen et al., 2004). Recent reports have pointed out that human resources 
comprise a fundamental constraint to improving health outcomes and reaching Millennium 
Development Goals (Joint Learning Initiative, 2004) (World Bank, 2004). It has further been 
stated that the lack of personnel with relevant skills forms a threat to the success of recent 
global initiatives such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, as well as 
other programmes intended for up-scaling health services to reach the Millennium 
Development Goals (Wyss, 2004). 
 
The most comprehensive overview of the available evidence on the HRH situation in 
Tanzania (Dominick and Kurowski, 2005) identifies a geographical imbalance as one of five 
main HRH problems, and identifies severe information gaps in this area. What appears to be 
clear from 2001/2002 census data is that the number of health workers per capita in Tanzania 
declined by 40% in the period from 1994/95 to 2001/02 (Kurowski, 2004), with medical 
cadres reduced from 34.8 per 100,000 population to 25.3 per 100,000 in the same period, 
mostly because of population growth. Another report (Joint Learning Initiative, 2004) states 
that there are only 0.02 physicians per 1000 population in Tanzania. This number is very low, 
even when compared with neighbouring countries like Uganda and Malawi. There is also 
large variation across districts: in Dar es Salaam, there are 0.14 doctors and specialists per 
thousand, while in Ruvuma there are only 0.004 per thousand. Similar patterns are found for 
other medical cadres (Kurowski, 2004). The line dividing districts with a relatively high 
number of staff from those with few staff can be drawn between rural and urban districts 
(Wyss, 2004). This emerging picture of difficulties in attracting health workers to rural 
districts is confirmed elsewhere, where the shortage of clinical officers and assistant medical 
officers relative to the staffing norm is calculated to be around 70% (McKinsey&Company, 
2004). 
 
According to Dominick and Kurowski (2005), the migration rates from rural to urban districts 
are unknown, and so a thorough analysis of the causes of this geographical imbalance is 
lacking. Overall, evidence on staff morale, satisfaction and motivation is scarce. More  3
specifically, there is little evidence on what is the most effective policy for encouraging 
Tanzanian health personnel to work in rural and rural remote districts. Lack of this evidence 
makes prioritizing between different policies aimed at correcting any geographical imbalance 
difficult and arbitrary, and the consequences of incorrectly allocating scarce resources may be 
severe (Bewley, 1995) (Fehr and Falk, 2002). 
 
This study seeks to identify some aspects of the choice of work among Tanzanian health 
workers. The aim is to understand more about the preference structure of Tanzanian health 
workers and to answer the following question: what are the most important determinants for 
health workers appraising the possibility of working and living in different parts of Tanzania? 
Furthermore, the government and health authorities of Tanzania need more information about 
the possible effects of policy interventions aimed at recruiting more health workers to rural 
and remote areas. An important goal of the study is thus to shed light on the effect of different 
policies on the probability of choosing employment in a rural remote district. 
 
Most information currently available on the willingness of health personnel to work in rural 
districts in Tanzania is from qualitative research. While these give valuable insight into 
complex and important issues, they provide little operational guidance for policy makers, for 
whom this paper will provide much-needed quantitative measures. Sixty per cent of 
Tanzanian clinical officer
1 (CO) finalists participated in an extensive discrete choice 
experiment (DCE) used to identify their preference structure. Although DCEs have become a 
common method of identifying preferences in health economics, few attempts at applying 
DCEs to health personnel in developing countries have been undertaken. Chomitz et al. 
(1998) made use of a variant of a stated preference method with doctors in Indonesia, 
Mangham (2006) conducted a DCE of nurses in Malawi, and another DCE has recently been 
conducted in Ethiopia (Hanson and Jack, 2007). However, as far as the authors are aware, the 
preference structure of Tanzanian health personnel has not been identified using a DCE or 
similar quantitative exercise. In addition, the preferences of mid-cadres
2 (like COs) have 
never been investigated properly. Mid-cadres represent a large and important share of the 
health workforce in Tanzania (some 9.5%. compared with 1.1% for medical doctors 
                                                 
1 A clinical officer is a role somewhere between a nurse and a medical doctor. They have more or less the same 
amount of education as nurses, but their training is more clinically oriented. In fact, clinical officers often 
function as medical doctors in rural areas. 
2 Mid-cadres are between nurses and medical doctors. They are mostly clinical officers and assistant medical 
officers.  4
(Kurowski, 2004)), and it is COs who form the backbone of the clinical workforce. This 
pattern is similar to many other developing countries. Their university qualifications are not 
often recognized in developed countries, and as result, these cadres are more likely to stay in 
their home country than other cadres (medical doctors and nurses). It is thus important and 
relevant to study the preferences of these groups. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the 
literature on the preferences of health personnel in developing countries. The focus is 
particularly on the empirical literature and on how different preferences affect the willingness 
to work in rural areas. Section 3 presents the data and method, while Section 4 specifies the 
econometric model and the estimations. Section 5 discusses the results, and Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Incentives identified in the empirical literature 
Pecuniary incentives, like higher salaries or hardship allowances for health workers stationed 
in rural districts, can help make rural jobs more attractive. A number of financial incentive 
schemes have been suggested, and it is often found that financial incentives have a positive 
effect on the willingness to work in rural areas; see, for instance, (Chomitz et al., 1998), 
(Serneels et al., 2005), (Kristiansen and Forde, 1992). The size of this effect, however, varies 
across schemes, countries and cadres. 
 
Several empirical studies also identify important non-pecuniary motivation factors. For 
instance, Vujicic et al. (2004) show that non-pecuniary incentives, like the provision of 
housing and the prospect of an opportunity to upgrade qualifications, are important reasons 
for wishing to migrate (Vujicic et al., 2004). Moreover, financial incentives have, in some 
cases, limited effects compared with non-financial incentives when it comes to self-esteem 
and job satisfaction (Kingma, 2003). Opportunities for educational upgrading, career 
development and colleagues in the work place are other motivating factors that have been 
found to be important when health workers decide where to work (Serneels et al., 2005) 
(Chomitz et al., 1998). Another suggestion is that the lack of equipment, supplies and 
appropriate facilities can act as a deterrent for health professionals accepting positions in rural 
and under-served areas. This is a primary factor given by medical students for not practicing 
in rural Pakistan (Zaidi, 1996). The study by Serneels et al. (2005), among others, investigates  5
the assumption of social preferences as important decision factors. They found that the 
students’ motivation to help the poor, as a proxy for their intrinsic motivation, was one of two 
main determinants of willingness to work in a rural area in Ethiopia. 
 
Drawing on existing research, there is also reason to believe that background variables and 
other personal characteristics can be important explanatory variables. Gender, family income, 
talent, education level and the regional base of the family are all variables that are likely to 
affect each individual’s willingness (and hence motivation) to work in rural districts. The 
influence of individual characteristics on the willingness to work in rural districts is 
particularly well documented. For example, Chomitz et al. (1998) show that the premium 
needed to make Indonesian health workers move to rural districts was substantially lower for 
students from rural districts than for students originally from Jakarta. A Japanese study also 
found that rural doctors were more likely to remain in practice in rural areas if they had a rural 
background, and men were much more likely to remain in rural practice than women 
(Matsumoto et al., 2005). This finding is supported by a study where it was observed that 
women are less likely to accept rural posts and that they are accordingly underrepresented in 
rural areas (Doescher et al., 2000). 
 
One suggested reason for women being less likely to move to rural districts is that there are 
fewer job opportunities for spouses and insufficient education opportunities for children 
(Dussault and Franceschini, 2006). Thus, the presence of family members in rural and remote 
areas increases the probability that an individual will consider these areas for the 
establishment of their practice (Dussault and Franceschini, 2006). In general, growing up in a 
rural community has been associated with a higher probability of practicing in rural areas 
(British Columbia Medical Association, 1998). That is, family matters in various ways: nurses 
in Malawi are more likely to work in rural districts if decent housing is offered (Mangham, 
2006), and household consumption is one of the two most important determinants for the 
willingness to work in rural districts in Ethiopia (Serneels et al., 2005). Finally, age also 
sometimes matters: younger individuals typically have fewer family responsibilities and are 
more prepared to move or migrate (Chomitz et al., 1998) (Serneels et al., 2005).  6
3. Data and the discrete choice experiment 
3.1 Data 
In general, we wish to study the preferences of Tanzanian health personnel for different job 
attributes, but we are particularly interested in what appear to be important determinants for 
choosing employment in a rural remote district. However, there is little natural variation in 
revealed preferences: wages are more or less the same throughout Tanzania, at least for those 
working in public health facilities, and there is a problem of vacant positions in rural districts. 
It was therefore necessary to collect data exclusively for this study. Thus, an extensive survey 
was administered to more than 300 final-year students training to be COs. COs were chosen 
because of their ability to do much of the practical work of a physician, and because they 
often function as physicians in rural districts. A discrete choice experiment (DCE) formed the 
main part of the survey, though we also collected demographics and other background 
characteristics of the health workers, like gender, age, rural background, etc., to control for 
personal characteristics. 
 
As preparation for developing the survey, a series of in-depth interviews were conducted with 
CO finalists in Kibaha and Sengerema in March 2007. The interviews, which were conducted 
in either English or Swahili depending on the student’s preference, were semi-structured and 
concentrated around positive and negative aspects of living and working in rural areas. We 
also asked what the students thought could attract them and their friends to rural areas. 
 
The quantitative data were collected during the autumn of 2007. Participation in the research 
was voluntary, and the participants were not compensated in any way. Some 320 CO finalists 
(around 60% of all CO finalists in Tanzania) from 10 randomly selected schools
3 participated 
in the DCE. All finalists in the selected schools were invited to participate. The data were 
mostly collected during school time, on the school premises. This largely explains the 
response rate of around 96%, which is unusually high for a DCE. Questionnaires that were 
not completed or were filled out by respondents from countries other than Tanzania were 
excluded from the sample, so the final sample used in the analysis comprised 296 
respondents. Appendix A.1 provides summary statistics for the sample (not commented upon 
here). 
                                                 
3 Appendix A.2 provides a list of the schools and a description of the selection procedure.  7
3.2 The discrete choice experiment 
 
The respondents were asked to make choices between two alternative jobs. These jobs were 
constructed as bundles of seven different attributes with different levels. The choice makers 
are assumed to have their own values of each of the seven attributes and to be able to make 
trade-offs between them. The extant empirical work—see, for instance, (Zaidi, 1996), 
(Ramachandran et al., 2005), (Mangham, 2006), (Manongi et al., 2006), (Serneels et al., 
2005), (Kurowski, 2004), (Kingma, 2003), (Heyes, 2005), (Hanson and Jack, 2007), (Gauri, 
2001), (Dussault and Franceschini, 2006), (Chomitz et al., 1998)—as well as economic and 
psychological theory played a valuable role in developing these attributes and their levels. A 
large number of important potential attributes were identified, but in order to restrict the 
complexity of the job alternatives, it was also necessary to restrict the number of attributes. 
The choice models applied in the analysis rely on the assumption that responders are able to 
make trade-offs between attributes and their levels in order to maximize utility. If the choice 
alternatives become too complex, there is a risk of people adopting other decision heuristics 
or lexicographic decision rules (Witt et al., 2008) (Scott, 2002)
4. The literature is inconclusive 
on the number of attributes that should be included, but somewhere between three and seven 
is normal in health economics (Ryan and Gerard, 2003), (Witt et al., 2008), (Scott, 2002). In 
this study, seven attributes are included. In this way, the job alternatives are not too complex 
while at the same time giving a relatively complete description of the job. In making the final 
decisions about which attributes to include and the levels to give, the in-depth interviews 
proved vital. 
 
The following seven attributes
5 were ultimately included. 
1) Working location 
2) Salary and allowances 
3) Possibilities of further education 
4) Workload 
5) Offer of decent housing 
                                                 
4 In order to investigate whether the respondents had really been able to make trade-offs between the various 
attributes, we interviewed 20 students, two at each location. In the interviews, we asked them to explain how 
they made the choices. The interviews were very reassuring in indicating that all interview subjects had 
understood the task and made appropriate trade-offs. 
5 Appendix A.3 describes the attributes and their levels in detail.  8
6) Availability of equipment and drugs at the institution 
7) Infrastructure 
A D-efficient computerized design allowing for interaction effects was applied in order to 
make the hypothetical jobs and combine them into choice pairs. The design is programmed to 
give an efficient combination of orthogonality, level balance and minimum overlap. This 
resulted in a design with 32 choices between pairs of jobs. The 32 choice sets were randomly 
divided into two blocks in order not to exhaust the respondents. Each respondent thus made 
16 binary choices. In addition, there were two versions of each block, where the order of 
choices was varied in order to correct for the effects of learning, exhaustion or tiredness that 
could be present
6. The DCE was tested in a pilot with 30 students at the Kilosa Clinical 
Officer Training Centre; as a result, the formulation of some of the attribute levels was 
changed. Moreover, some of the questions were reformulated. Appendix A.4 provides an 
example of a choice set and a copy of the instructions given to the respondents. 
4. Specification of the econometric model and estimations 
4.1 The choice model 
The underlying assumption of this analysis is that health workers have a complete ranking of 
jobs with varying attribute levels. This ranking is given by their preferences for the attributes 
and their respective levels. As rational economic individuals, the health workers maximize 
utility given their preferences for different job attributes; that is, they will always choose the 
alternative that best matches their preferences. The preferences are influenced by the 
background characteristics of the individual such as gender, religion, etc. 
 
Our point of departure in the analysis of the data is a logit model consistent with McFadden`s 
choice model (McFadden, 1974). The basis of the logit model is the concept of utility 
maximization. The decision maker, n, assumed to be a rational economic individual, faces a 
choice among J (in our case 2, which gives us a standard logit model) alternatives, and he/she 




                                                 
6 Including person-specific fixed effects did not alter the results.  9
The utility that decision maker n receives from alternative j is given by: 
j , V U nj nj nj ∀ ε + = . 
 
However, the utility is not directly observable. The researcher can observe Vnj, sometimes 
referred to as the representative utility, while εnj is unobservable and treated as random. It is 
assumed that εnj is a distributed IID extreme value. 
 
The logit choice probabilities (the probability of choosing alternative i over alternative j), 
following McFadden (1974), are given by: 
) i j V V ( Pr
) i j V V ( Pr P
nj ni ni nj
nj nj ni ni ni
≠ ∀ − + ε < ε =
≠ ∀ ε + > ε + =
. 
 
The representative utility, Vnj is specified to be linear in parameters: 
nj
'
nj x V β =  
xnj is a vector of observed variables relating to alternative j. Because εni is not given, the 
choice probability is the integral of Pni|εni over all values of εni weighted by its density. The 
















The random utility model outlined here is concerned with the utility of one alternative 
compared with another. Thus, in practice, the preferences for one alternative over another are 
estimated. 
 
The parameters and their estimated coefficients can only give information about the direction 
and significance of the effect by changing the levels of one attribute, all other things being 
equal. For policy makers (and normally economists), however, the most interesting analysis is  10
one that offers opportunities for the valuation and comparison of different policies. We 
therefore use the regression results to calculate willingness to pay (WTP) and policy impact 
measures. 
4.2 Willingness to pay 
In order to calculate the WTP for job attributes, it is convenient to think of the wage variable 
as continuous. Assuming that the contribution of the wage to utility is quadratic, the 
regression model will be: 
C e rastructur equipment workload house DSM regionalhq
districthq years education years education years education wage wage U
+ + + + + + +
+ + + + + =
inf
2 4 6
12 11 10 9 8 7
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β β β β β β
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All variables refer to the attributes described in Section 3.2 and Appendix A.3. A dummy is 
constructed for each level of the attributes, except for the wage variable, which is treated as 
continuous because of technicalities. Because the wage variable is continuous and quadratic, 
the willingness to sacrifice wages to get a higher level of another job attribute is a function of 




















− = . 
 
This WTP measure is calculated for all wage levels, but we only report that for the lowest 
wage level as best reflecting the current circumstances. We calculate the p-values and 
standard errors using the delta method. 
4.3 Policy impact 
We can consider the change in the probability of taking the baseline job
7 due to a change of 
the level in one of the job attributes as the impact of a policy that changes the level of this 
attribute. When calculating this impact, we let the wage variable be continuous and quadratic, 
like the WTP calculation. The regression model thus appears as that outlined for the WTP 
                                                 
7 The lowest levels of the attributes are the baseline levels, while the dummies in the regression indicate the 
higher levels. Thus, the baseline job is that job with the lowest level of all attributes.  11
model. The change in the probability of taking the baseline job because of a change in one of 
the job attributes—say, if we raise the salary to 350,000 Tanzanian shillings (TSH) per 
month—is then (as long as all other attributes remain equal) given by: 
2 ^ 350 * 350 * 2 ^ 200 * 200 *
2 ^ 200 * 200 *
2 ^ 350 * 350 * 2 ^ 200 * 200 *
2 ^ 350 * 350 *
200 350 2 1 2 1
2 1
2 1 2 1
2 1
β β β β
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Again, we calculate the standard errors and 95% confidence intervals using the delta method. 
4.4 Dominant preferences 
WTP measures and other marginal effects can be overestimated if the respondents have 
dominant preferences for any of the attributes (Scott, 2002). For each attribute and each 
respondent, we have thus checked whether all the chosen alternatives have a higher level of 
the attribute in question, or put differently, that the respondent always chose the alternative 
with the highest level of the attribute. If not, the respondent is said not to have dominant 
preferences. In general, there were extremely few dominant preferences. The only dominant 
preferences found in the data set were from two respondents who had dominant preferences 
for infrastructure. As these respondents were trading off other attributes they were not 
excluded from the data set. 
5. Results & discussion 
Appendix A.5 presents the regression results. However, for policy purposes, the most 
interesting feature of the econometric analysis is the marginal analysis. That is, what happens 
to the probability of taking a job in a rural district when there is a change in a job attribute? 
Moreover, which policies will be most effective in increasing the probability of Tanzanian 
health personnel taking a job in rural districts? Two different methods that potentially help 
answer these questions are applied. First, the WTP—or rather the willingness to sacrifice 
some salary and allowances to get a higher level of one of the other attributes—is estimated 
and presented in Section 5.1. Second, Section 5.2 investigates and presents the change in the 
probability of taking a job in a remote area resulting from increasing the levels of the other 
job attributes. From earlier empirical research in this area, we may expect various subgroups 
to react differently to different policies. As a result, we repeat the exercise for different 
subgroups and give the results in Sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2 and 5.2.3.  12
5.1 Willingness to pay 
Table 1 shows the results of the WTP calculation. These measures explain how much of the 




On average, the CO finalists are willing to give up 306,166 TSH per month to obtain the 
possibility of more education after two years of service in place of the base level of no 
education. The measure gives us a clear indication about the importance of getting more 
education as soon as possible. A closer examination supports this impression. On average, the 
CO finalists are willing to pay 96,796 TSH in order to obtain education after six years of 
service in place of no further education opportunities. When the time of service before 
education is reduced to four years, we see that they are willing to sacrifice another 96,316 
TSH of salary every month. However, it is when the time of service is reduced by another two 
years that we see the strongest effect: the CO finalists are then willing to sacrifice an extra 
113,054 TSH per month. In-depth interviews done with CO finalists in March 2007 largely 
confirm that they are eager to gain more knowledge and to begin building their careers. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
In terms of location, there is an average willingness to sacrifice 57,151 TSH per month to 
work in the district headquarters rather than a remote area. Alternatively, in order to work in a 
rural remote place rather than the district headquarters, 57,151 TSH would have to be added 
to the salary every month. This is relatively intuitive, as the district headquarters, although it 
may be small, can offer a number of services and a very different working environment from 
that found in remote areas. Compared with the WTP for education possibilities, this measure 
is quite small. The WTP for a job in the regional headquarters is insignificant and very small. 
It is then likely that there are forces pushing the decision in opposite directions: in district 
headquarters, as well as remote areas, COs do more or less everything, gaining much 
experience and working relatively autonomously as clinicians. However, in the regional 
headquarters, the health facilities are generally better equipped than in remote areas. The data 
                                                 
8 This is the most realistic WTP measure as the starting wage for public clinical officers is presently just above 
200,000 TSH. The WTP can also be calculated for other wage levels. The general pattern is that people are 
willing to pay more (and have to be compensated more for negative policies) when they have higher salaries.  13
are inconclusive on the relative strength of these opposing forces. In contrast, students have to 




Most research from other countries has documented that the more central a job, the more it is 
preferred by the various types of health workers. However, one study has actually found a 
similar pattern: nurses participating in a DCE in Malawi preferred, on average, to work in 
small towns rather than large cities (Mangham, 2006). Another study also found a similar 
pattern among female medical and nurse students in Indonesia: they preferred to do their 
internship in cities other than the capital, Jakarta (Chomitz et al., 1998). None of these studies, 
however, provided an explanation for these findings. Again, the in-depth interviews with 
students before and after the DCE was conducted, may provide some insights. For instance, 
several students were apprehensive that if they took a job in Dar es Salaam, they would not be 
allowed to do ‘fun’ and interesting things. As there is a lower shortage of labour in Dar es 
Salaam, and given that the workforce there is more educated than in other places in the 
country, newly trained COs are afraid that they will lose their autonomy and be given few 
challenging tasks and too little responsibility. Costs of living are likely to be a particular 
concern to young people who are on the verge of settling, and Dar es Salaam is considered 
more expensive than other urban or semi-urban areas. However, it is worth noting from Table 
1 that respondents value both good infrastructure and education opportunities more than they 
dislike Dar es Salaam. Thus, our observation that they have to be compensated does not 
necessarily contradict the general empirical pattern of an inflow of people and health workers 
to Dar es Salaam. In general, the students are not very concerned with the location of their job 
compared with other features like education possibilities, the equipment situation at the health 
institution and infrastructure. 
 
On average, the respondents were willing to reduce their monthly salary by 190,348 TSH if 
they could have a job in an area with decent infrastructure
10. Equipment did not appear to be 
as important as general infrastructure, but they were willing to pay 110,972 TSH per month in 
order to work in an institution with sufficient equipment and drugs compared with one 
without them. Finally, housing has been proposed as an alternative means of compensating 
                                                 
9 This is a real economic result, not merely a consequence of the way in which the statistical software treats zero 
values. 
10 Defined as ‘mobile coverage, electricity and water’.  14
and attracting health workers, but it appears that this is not very highly valued among CO 
finalists. While they are willing to pay a certain amount of their salary (57,288 TSH) to get a 
house, compared with education and the prerequisites needed to do their job as taught, the 
offer of a house appears to mean little. 
 
Although the preference for workload is not significant, it is worthwhile noting that it is 
negative as this reflects what quite often arose in the in-depth interviews; namely, that a high 
workload at this stage of their career is valuable because it gives more experience. Thus, not 
all newly qualified COs are deterred by jobs with a heavy workload. On the contrary, some 
seek it in order to gain more experience. 
 
In sum, the WTP analysis tells us that the possibility of more education is by far the most 
valued feature of a job when measured by the amount of salary one is willing to give up in 
order to get a higher level of another attribute. Other factors that more directly concern the 
ability to do a good job, like infrastructure and sufficient equipment, are also very important. 
Offers of decent housing and location appear not to be as important for the next generation of 
COs. However, a policy that aims at offering housing is likely to have a positive effect, 
though on a relatively small scale. 
5.2 Policy impact 
By differentiating the probability function with respect to changes in job attributes, we can 
forecast the effectiveness of different policies. The point of departure is a job in a remote 
area
11 where the salary is 200,000 TSH, no education is offered, no house is offered, the 
workload is relatively high, there is little and/or outdated equipment, and the infrastructure is 
poor. This may appear as a worst-case scenario, but the reality is that it is rather close to many 
rural remote areas in Tanzania. Table 2 presents the general effectiveness of the policies. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Although increased salaries are often the first thing that springs to mind when thinking about 
ways to increase recruitment to rural areas, this measure alone may not be the most efficient 
way to recruit more health workers to rural districts. Increasing the monthly starting salary up 
                                                 
11 Defined as ‘a 3-hour (or more) bus ride from the district headquarters’.  15
to 650,000 TSH will surprisingly not have the strongest effect on the probability of taking a 
job in a remote area as it increases the probability by 62 percentage points. However, such a 
policy would be extremely expensive, certainly from day one. Increasing the wages slightly 
less, to 500,000 TSH per month also appears to be an effective measure, as it increases the 
probability of taking the remote job by 47 percentage points. Finally, increasing wages to 
350,000 TSH per month will increase the probability of taking a remote job by 26 percentage 
points. These results show that while the regulation of salary and allowances is a powerful 
instrument, this instrument becomes less effective as salaries increase. That is, raising wages 
to 350,000 TSH increases the probability of taking a remote job by 26 percentage points, and 
raising it by another 150,000 to 500,000 TSH increases the probability by 21 percentage 
points, but increasing it by another 150,000 to 650,000 TSH increases the probability by only 
18 percentage points. If wage increases are the chosen policy, it may be better, after raising 
wages to a certain level, to include policies other than increasing wages further. 
 
To offer possibilities for further education after two years of service may be another policy 
instrument for authorities. This proves to be the second most effective policy as it increases 
the probability of taking a remote job by 52 percentage points if the education offer is after 
two years of service. In comparison, providing education opportunities after 4 and 6 years of 
service increases the respective probability of taking a rural job by only 35 and 18 percentage 
points. A policy where further education or upgrading of qualifications follows a certain 
period of service in a rural area could thus also form a well-aimed instrument for correcting 
the geographical imbalance of the health workforce. This kind of policy can also be 
convenient as it postpones costs. Better access to education may also provide positive 
externalities, unless the health workers then become attractive to other countries and other 
working locations. The policy of promising more education after a certain time of service has 
a catch, and that is the question of whether the health workers will trust the authorities when 
they make such promises. Several of the respondents responded in the in-depth interviews that 
although the offer sounded tempting, they were not sure whether they could afford to trust this 
promise. The authorities will thus have to provide some kind of commitment in advance for 
this policy to be credible. 
 
Investing in infrastructure is another way to make rural remote areas more attractive (and in 
some ways, less remote) not only for health workers but also for entrepreneurs, public 
servants and other service providers. Our analysis shows that if the authorities provided  16
decent basic infrastructure, the probability of taking a remote job would increase by 34 
percentage points. The remaining policy instruments follow according to their effect on the 
probability of taking a job in a remote area: supplying the health institution with a sufficient 
amount of equipment and drugs (21 percentage points) and offering decent houses to health 
workers (11 percentage points). 
 
In general, the marginal effects are quite substantial and the standard errors are relatively 
small, so we can expect to see positive effects from any of the suggested policies. There is one 
exception; namely, the policy of decreasing workload. There may be several reasons why this 
policy does not give a significant effect. Furthermore, because the result is not merely 
statistical, there must be an underlying economic reason. As discussed earlier, students did not 
appear to agree on whether a reduction in workload was a good or bad thing. Some 
respondents wanted experience and welcomed a high workload, while others wanted to have 
time to do things apart from their official job and were sceptical about the benefits of high 
workloads. Another thing that makes it difficult to obtain a clear effect from reducing 
workloads is that there is not a clear understanding, among either students or authorities, on 
what the present level of workload actually is in remote areas. 
5.2.1 Impact depending on gender 
Table 3 displays the impact of policies (changes in probabilities) for different subgroups. 
Separate regressions are run, and the probabilities are calculated for each subgroup. The 
second and third columns of Table 3 show the respective results for male and female 
respondents. As shown, women tend to be significantly less responsive to pecuniary 
incentives: increasing salaries to 650,000 had a lower effect on females than on males. 
Increasing salaries over a certain level would thus be less effective in attracting female COs to 
rural remote places. Women are also more concerned with infrastructure and the resource 
situation in a potential work place than their male counterparts: good infrastructure, the offer 
of a house and sufficient equipment contributes more positively to their utility (and hence 
their probability of taking the job). Another interesting pattern is also worth noting in that 
women appear to be more patient when it comes to how much they value the opportunity of 
getting education after 6 years compared with after 2 years. Male respondents have a much 
steeper response curve to education than females: they value education opportunities after 6 
years less than the female respondents, and after 2 years significantly higher than the female 
respondents.  17
[Table 3 about here] 
5.2.2 Impact depending on rural remote background 
There are also significant differences between the preferences of students with parents living 
in rural (remote) areas and other students, as shown in the fourth and fifth columns of Table 3. 
Students with parents living in rural remote areas are significantly less responsive to 
pecuniary incentives at all levels. They are also significantly less responsive to an offer of 
education after two years of service, although the difference between the groups is not great. 
Furthermore, there are significant differences in the effects from improving the equipment and 
drug situation at the health facilities and the infrastructure in the area. Those with a rural 
background are generally less responsive to these attributes. This reflects a general (but not 
always significant) pattern that students with parents living in remote areas generally value all 
job attributes less than other students. All policies related to changing the level of job 
attributes will thus have less effect on these particular COs. It is likely, however, that this 
group is already more likely to take jobs in rural remote places, which may to some extent 
explain why these students are less responsive to incentives. 
5.2.3 Impact depending on willingness to help people 
Intrinsic motivation, or to be exact, its proxy in the form of a willingness to help the poor, has 
been found to be one of the most successful variables in explaining the willingness to work in 
rural areas (Serneels et al., 2005). This finding is little tested in similar empirical studies from 
developing countries. Our survey allowed us to check whether students who were found to be 
very willing to help other people react to incentives differently from other students. A dummy 
variable that measures willingness to help other people was constructed on the basis of total 
agreement to all of the following three statements: 1) “I feel good when I can help other 
people, even if it means I have to work very hard”; 2) “The general satisfaction coming from 
helping other people is the same no matter what I get paid”; and 3) “As long as I receive the 
minimum public salary for COs, I am willing to work where most needed in order to help as 
many as possible”. The sixth and seventh columns in Table 3 present the estimated 
regressions for these subgroups (those very willing and those not so willing to help other 
people), respectively. 
 
First, we can see that those who are motivated by being able to help other people are much 
less responsive to pecuniary incentives, particularly when salaries increase to over 350,000  18
TSH per month. This reflects a general pattern: finalists who are very willing to help are also 
generally less responsive to incentives. However, there is one attribute that this group is very 
concerned with; namely, the equipment and drugs available at the heath facility. They are 
substantially and significantly more responsive to a policy of providing sufficient equipment 
and drugs than their counterparts. This makes sense as the provision of equipment and drugs 
is an important prerequisite for helping people. Second, while the other subgroups keep more 
or less the same ranking of incentives/policies as the average, the subgroup of people very 
willing to help others have a slightly different ranking. The most important differences are 
that they are more responsive to obtaining opportunities for more education after 2 years than 
to a monthly wage of 650,000 TSH, and that they more highly value sufficient equipment and 
drugs. Equipping health facilities properly and ensuring a sufficient amount of drugs may thus 
attract more newly qualified COs who are very motivated to help other people. 
6. Concluding comments 
When discussing the geographical imbalance of the health workforce, it is common to refer to 
rural and rural remote areas with a bundle of negative associations. Our results underline that 
it is important to bear in mind that it is not necessarily the geographical location per se that 
hinders COs from taking jobs in rural areas but rather poor infrastructure and the fear of 
falling behind in professional development. In practice, this is important because it means that 
policies to correct the imbalance not only have to be compensating but also can aim to change 
the prerequisites in rural areas. However, this analysis focuses on the preference structure for 
a certain type of medical cadre at a particular stage of his/her career. In this phase, it is very 
important to obtain as much experience as possible and to become well educated (i.e., to 
obtain a higher grade than CO). Generalizations to other cadres and to COs who have come 
further along in their careers may be misleading and difficult as their preferences are likely to 
be quite different from those analysed here. 
 
A problem with stated preference data, like the data drawn from surveys, is that respondents 
will not have to demonstrate their willingness to take different jobs; e.g., actually to work in 
rural districts. Unfortunately, there is not much to do about this when there are no data on 
revealed preferences. When stating their preferences, respondents will also have incentives to 
manipulate the results of the analysis. However, we sought to avoid this problem by using a 
DCE. A final warning: this analysis deals with the effect of different policy measures, not the 
costs of implementing them. For any government with budget constraints, it would be  19
advisable to do a thorough analysis of the net gain (loss) from implementing different 
measures before concluding what is the most efficient thing to do.  20
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Table 1 
Willingness to pay given a wage of 200,000 TSH per month* 
Variable  Willingness to pay**  Lower level of 95% conf. interval  Upper level of 95% conf. interval 
Education after 6 years of service  96,796  41,237  152,356 
Education after 4 years of service  193,112  130,718  255,505 
Education after 2 years of service  306,166  207,475  404,857 
District headquarters  57,151  15,988  98,314 
Regional headquarters  5,755  –28,356  39,866 
Dar es Salaam  –82,171  –129,533  –34,809 
Housing provided  57,288  25,926  88,651 
Reduced workload  –16,430  –42,630  9,770 
Sufficient equipment  110,972  71,886  150,058 
Infrastructure 190,348  129,515  251,181 
Number of observations  9342     
LR Chi
2 (13)  1627.86     
Prob > Chi
2 0.0000     
Pseudo R
2 0.2514     
* Estimated with the wage attribute as a continuous and quadratic variable. 
** TSH per month.   23
Table 2 
Changes in probabilities, the whole sample* 
Change from base line  Change in probability  Standard error  P > |z| 
Wage 350,000 TSH  .261  .0274  0.000 
Wage 500,000 TSH  .468  .0271  0.000 
Wage 650,000 TSH  .618  .0211  0.000 
Education after 6 years of service  .179  .0453  0.000 
Education after 4 years of service  .346  .0336  0.000 
Education after 2 years of service  .517  .0253  0.000 
Housing provided  .107  .0245  0.000 
Reduced workload  –.031  .0242  0.204 
Sufficient equipment  .205  .0208  0.000 
Infrastructure .342  .0169  0.000 
Number of observations  9342     
LR Chi
2 (13)  1627.86     
Prob > Chi
2 0.0000     
Pseudo R
2 0.2514     
* Estimated with the wage attribute as a continuous and quadratic variable.   24
Table 3 
Changes in probabilities, subgroups* 
Variable Male  Female  Rural remote 
background 
Not rural remote 
background 
Very much willing to 
help 
Not so much willing to 
help 






























































































































Number of observations  5986  3324  3062  6176  1974  7336 
LR chi2 (13)  1061.54  614.54  398.86  1250.44  298.79  1355.32 
Prob > chi2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo R2  .2558  .2667  .1879  .2921  .2184  .2665 
* Changes in probability are in bold. Asterisks indicate the statistical significance at the * 10% level, ** 5% level, and *** 1% level. Standard errors are in brackets. A 
regression is run for each subgroup. The differences between the preferences of subgroups that are statistically significant are indicated by §. Note that the total number of 
observations may vary with the groups examined. For example, when analysing the differences between the preferences of men and women, observations where the 
respondent has failed to answer the question of gender are removed from the sample, while when analysing the preferences of students with a rural remote background versus 
other students, those who have failed to answer are also removed from the sample. The same applies when analysing students with or without a strong motivation to help 
people. The variation in results is negligible.  25
Appendix 
Table A.1 
Summary statistics of respondents* 
Variable Mean  Std.  dev  Min.  Max. 
Sex (male = 0, female = 1)  .358  .4795  0  1 
Age 30.762  8.7983  20  59 
Rural remote background  .336  .4722  0  1 
Help others 1  1.355  .7639  1  5 
Help others 2  2.465  1.4195  1  5 
Help others 3  2.369  1.3936  1  5 
Help others index  .209  .4068  0  1 
*Rural background (yes = 1, no = 0): parents live in a rural remote area (a 3-hour or more bus ride from the 
district headquarters). 
Help others 1: “I feel good when I can help people, even if it means I have to work very hard”. 1 = strongly 
agree – 5 = strongly disagree. 
Help others 2: “The general satisfaction coming from helping other people is the same no matter what I get 
paid”. 1 = strongly agree – 5 = strongly disagree. 
Help others 3: “As long as I receive the minimum public salary for COs, I am willing to work where it is most 
needed in order to help as many as possible”. 1 = strongly agree – 5 = strongly disagree. 
Help others index: Index indicating whether a respondent has the value 1 on all of the three variables: help others 
1, help others 2 and help others 3. Very much willing to help = 1, not so much willing to help = 0.   26
Table A.2 
List of schools in the sample and description of sampling procedure 
School 
Kibaha Clinical Officer Training Centre 
Lindi Clinical Officer Training Centre 
Lushoto Clinical Officer Training Centre 
Machame Clinical Officer Training Centre 
Mafinga Clinical Officer Training Centre 
Masasi Clinical Officer Training Centre 
Mtwara Clinical Officer Training Centre 
Musoma Clinical Officer Training Centre 
Mvumi Clinical Officer Training Centre 
Sengerema Clinical Officer Training Centre 
Selection procedure: Ten schools were drawn randomly from 18 clinical officer-training centres. Two of the 
drawn schools were excluded because of logistical problems (they were very remote and difficult to reach at the 
planned time for data collection, and they had very few students), and two more schools were drawn from the 
total sample.   27
Table A.3 
The attributes and their levels* 
Attributes Salary  and 
allowances 
Education opportunities/ 
possibility of upgrading 
qualifications: 
Location Availability  of 
equipment & 
drugs 
 Workload  Housing  Infrastructure 
Level 1  650,000 TSH 
per month 
Education offered after 2 
years of service. 
Dar es Salaam  Sufficient  Normal: nearly enough 
time to complete duties. 





The place has mobile 
coverage, electricity & 
water. 
Level 2  500,000 TSH 
per month 
Education offered after 4 
years of service. 
Regional 
headquarters 
Insufficient  Heavy: barely enough time 
to complete duties. Three 
hours of extra work per 
day. 
No house is 
provided. 
The place has unreliable 
mobile coverage, no 
electricity or water. 
Level 3  350,000 TSH 
per month 
Education offered after 6 
years of service. 
District headquarters         
Level 4  200,000 TSH 
per month 
No education offered.  A 3-hour or more 
bus ride from the 
district headquarters 
      
* For practicality, the ‘salary & allowances’ attribute is referred to as a wage.   28
A.4 
Description of the choice-making task 
The students were presented with the following instructions. In addition to having the instructions on a paper in 
front of them, these were read out loud by the research assistant, and clarifying answers to questions from the 
respondents were given in both English and Swahili. 
You will in the following be presented with a number of jobs, two at the time. The jobs are supposed to illustrate 
the working situation in Tanzania today and some possible improvements. However, the jobs are hypothetical 
constructions and you are not supposed to evaluate how realistic they may be, just how much you like/dislike 
them. 
Each job will consist of different levels of the following elements. 
1)  Location 
2)  Workload 
3)  Infrastructure 
4)  Salary & allowances (note that we refer to the total sum of salary AND allowances) 
5)  Housing 
6)  Education opportunities/possibilities of upgrading qualifications 
7)  Availability of equipment and drugs 
For each pair of jobs you are presented with, you are asked to decide which of the alternatives you will take 
given your current circumstances. Please use only the information you are given about the jobs to evaluate 
them. Several aspects of a job may not be mentioned, but it is important that you evaluate only those aspects of a 
job that are described in the questionnaire. 





Housing: Education  opportunities/ 
possibility of upgrading 
qualifications: 
Workload: Infrastructure:  Salary  and 
allowances: 
Location: 
Sufficient  No house is 
provided. 
Education offered after 6 years 
of service. 
Normal: Nearly enough time to 
complete duties. One hour of 
extra work per day. 
The place has mobile 












Housing: Education  opportunities/ 
possibility of upgrading 
qualifications: 
Workload: Infrastructure:  Salary  and 
allowances: 
Location: 
Insufficient A  decent 
house is 
provided. 
Education offered after 2 years 
of service. 
Heavy; barely enough time to 
complete duties. Three hours of 
extra work per day. 
The place has unreliable 
mobile coverage, no 




A 3-hour or more 
bus ride from the 
district 
headquarters 
Considering your current situation, which of the two jobs would you take? 
Job A:     Job B:   
Now it is time to begin the real exercise! If you have any questions while working with it, please do not hesitate to ask the supervising interviewer for help!  30
Table A.5 
Preferences for job attributes* 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard error  P > |z| 
Wage 350,000 TSH  .302  .0771  0.000 
Wage 500,000 TSH  1.079  .0711  0.000 
Wage 650,000 TSH  1.313  .0731  0.000 
Education after 6 years of service  .316  .0938  0.001 
Education after 4 years of service  .716  .0753  0.000 
Education after 2 years of service  1.085  .0702  0.000 
District headquarters  .216  .0723  0.003 
Regional headquarters  .068  .0663  0.305 
Dar es Salaam  –.246  .0780  0.002 
Housing provided  .200  .0500  0.000 
Reduced workload  –.053  .0482  0.272 
Sufficient equipment  .397  .0438  0.000 
Infrastructure .713  .0386  0.000 
Constant –.001  .0408  0.990 
Log likelihood  –2413.1387  Prob > chi2  0.0000 
Number of obs.  9342  Pseudo R2  0.2547 
LR chi
2(14) 1649.10     
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